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Integrating Security
into the Curriculum
he number of skilled practitioners of computer secu-
rity who are able to address the complexities of mod-
ern technology and are familiar with successful
approaches to system security is very small. People
want security but are faced with two difficulties. First,
they do not know how to achieve it in the context of
their enterprises. They may not even know of a way
to translate organizational procedures into policies,
much less implement a set of mechanisms to enforce
those policies. Second, they have no way of knowing
whether their chosen mechanisms are effective.
The recent US Presidential Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection recommends developing edu-
cation on methods of “reducing vulnerabilities and
responding to attacks on critical infrastructures.” The
commission recognizes the need to make the “required
skill set much broader and deeper in educational level
[for] computer scientists, network engineers, elec-
tronics engineers, [and] business process engineers.”1
Broadly speaking, the engineering discipline is fun-
damentally designed to assure results using techniques
based on scientific principles. In terms of information
assurance and security, the goal of engineering is to
build secure systems from the outset rather than to dis-
cover that what we have built is inadequate. By mov-
ing to an educational system that cultivates an
appropriate knowledge of security, we can increase the
likelihood that our next generation of IT workers will
have the background needed to design and develop sys-
tems that are engineered to be reliable and secure.
WHAT IS COMPUTER SECURITY?
The field of computer security focuses on designing
systems that can enforce security policies even in the
presence of malicious code. One of the great difficul-
ties of security engineering is that subverted systems
may appear to behave normally and a lack of security
may not be evident. Systems must be engineered to be
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Computer security can be used as a vehicle
to achieve accreditation goals for computer
science and engineering programs, while at
the same time engaging students with
relevant, exciting topics. The authors’
approach, based on educational outcomes,
illustrates that security topics can
contribute to an engineering program by 
fostering all skills required to produce 
graduates capable of critical thinking.
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secure as part of their conception, design, and imple-
mentation.
The challenge is to design, develop, and deploy com-
plex systems with confidence in their ability to satisfy
security requirements. A theory of computer security
has emerged that offers a formal method for security
engineering.2 This theory has three components: pol-
icy, mechanism, and assurance. Charles Pfleeger and
Deborah Cooper3 expand on these components by list-
ing broad classifications of security concepts:
• Policy. Understanding the threats from which
information needs to be protected to ensure con-
fidentiality, integrity, and availability.
• Privilege. Creating mechanisms to distinguish
and control the ability of active system entities to
access and affect system resources.
• Identification and authorization. Associating the
activities of the executing computer with indi-
vidual users who may be held accountable for the
activities undertaken on their behalf.
• Correctness. Providing assurance that the hardware,
software, and systems for security policy enforce-
ment are not susceptible to tampering or bypass.
• Audit. Creating traces and the ability to interpret
them.
The implication here is that to achieve a coherent secu-
rity architecture, security must be considered from the
outset—not as an afterthought. Also, competence in
design for security policy enforcement, testing for
security, and assessment of security must be part of
the education of system implementers.
COMPUTER SECURITY IN EDUCATION
Two important criteria for selecting outcomes for
information security education are as follows:
• The education must result in graduates prepared
for the security challenges they will encounter in
their professional roles.
• The specific educational outcomes for security in
a given educational program must be consistent
with those of the larger engineering context.
It is unreasonable, however, to suggest that everybody
should know everything about security. Instead, we
propose matching appropriate knowledge and skills
with typical roles in the information society. Cynthia
Irvine identifies ten such roles,4 including software and
hardware developers, system architects, system certi-
fiers, CERT members, and security researchers.
In the skill set specified for engineering programs
by the Accreditation Board for Engineering and
Technology, engineering programs must demonstrate
that their graduates have:
1. An ability to apply knowledge of math, science,
and engineering.
2. An ability to design and conduct experiments, as
well as to analyze and interpret data.
3. An ability to design a system, component, or
process to meet desired needs.
4. An ability to function on multidisciplinary teams.
5. An ability to identify, formulate, and solve engi-
neering problems.
6. An understanding of professional and ethical
responsibility.
7. An ability to communicate effectively.
8. The broad education necessary to understand the
impact of engineering solutions in a global and
societal context.
9. A recognition of the need for—and an ability to
engage in—lifelong learning.
10. A knowledge of contemporary issues.
11. An ability to use the techniques, skills, and mod-
ern engineering tools necessary for engineering
practice.
To understand how security topics could be used to
distinguish a computer science or computer engineer-
ing curriculum and to achieve ABET Criterion 3 goals,
we decided to focus on a set of high-level educational
objectives as the basis of a security-enhanced curricu-
lum that would prepare students for the five roles
listed above.
Understanding objectives
A major goal in com-
puter engineering and
computer science is to
construct computer sys-
tems or processes that
meet a desired end or
requirement. To do so,
students must learn how
to express overall sys-
tem objectives.
A general goal of secu-
rity is to develop com-
puting systems that can ensure security policy
enforcement in the presence of malicious software and
abusive user behavior. This particular security goal may
encompass policy objectives for information confiden-
tiality, integrity, or availability. In addition, the system
must provide a mechanism to hold its users accountable
for their actions through identification, authentication,
and audit. Users must have confidence that their infor-
mation will, in fact, be protected within the system.
By understanding objectives, students will have the
ability to state a requirement’s purpose, significance,
and achievability and to determine the consistency of
requirements and purposes.
.
Defining problems
The fundamental char-
acteristic of engineer-
ing is the ability to
answer the question,
“Does this structure of
components have the
properties required for
the purpose for which
they are designed?”
Engineers ask this
question at all levels of
design, from the level
of transistors to the systems themselves.
We can define security requirements as the prop-
erties of a system that must hold during system oper-
ation. The question at each level of design becomes,
“Does this structure of components map to a secu-
rity mechanism about which we can have confidence
even in the presence of malicious code?” Using formal
security policy models and specifications to provide
a chain of evidence that the implementation corre-
sponds to policy can demonstrate the feasibility of an
actual implementation.
The formulation of appropriate questions and
problems to be solved in the context of the discipline
yields the ability to formulate questions of significance
relative to the overall purpose; to state the problem
to be solved and how it can be decomposed; and to
determine the feasibility of the problem’s solution.
Understanding context
Concerns at the archi-
tectural level require
describing a combina-
tion of computer and
network security mech-
anisms to ensure a 
coherent system for pol-
icy enforcement. The
software developer must
be concerned with the
use of hardware mecha-
nisms to support these security objectives. The hard-
ware designer, meanwhile, must attempt to construct
devices that support protection objectives while keep-
ing in mind a wide variety of software implementations.
An appreciation of the contexts brought to bear
upon a problem through various roles permits students
to internalize the ability to design and analyze solu-
tions to meet requirements and specifications at mul-
tiple levels of abstraction and from several viewpoints;
to understand the impact actions on one level or in one
viewpoint have on other levels or viewpoints; and to
trade off several requirements from different view-
points in order to achieve the maximum benefit.
Reasoning empirically
Engineers often obtain
empirical results at the
lab bench by building
prototypes and measur-
ing their performance.
These methods are also
applicable to security.
Functional interface test-
ing, internal engineering
tests of selected subsys-
tems, system generation
and recovery tests, and unit and module testing are all
parts of the development process for a secure system.
In the lab, prototype systems can be built and exam-
ined for security flaws. Performance issues may also
be examined by balancing expected decreases in vul-
nerability against user convenience and system effi-
ciency. Techniques for assessing system vulnerability
can be used to examine real systems for genuine flaws.
The educational outcome for cultivating a focus on
empirical reasoning skills includes the ability to con-
struct experiments or prototypes to demonstrate some
purpose or facilitate some meaningful exploration and
the ability to observe, collect, analyze, and interpret
data from experiments.
Synthesizing knowledge
The fundamental theo-
ries and the reasoning
techniques that allow
those theories to be
expressed define a dis-
cipline. In computer
science and engineer-
ing, the fundamental
theoretical concepts
are based on mathe-
matics, logic, and
physics. These theoretical concepts form the princi-
ples of construction and analysis. In electrical and
computer engineering, linear systems theory is based
on sinusoidal signal composition and on superposi-
tion, which gives rise to the classical treatments of net-
works, controls, and communications theory.
The construction of computer hardware—and to a
lesser extent software—is based on logic, predicate
calculus, discrete math, and finite-state machine the-
ory. In addition to applying standard mathematical
foundations to constructing hardware and software,
security includes theoretical concepts to support the
development and use of cryptography and crypto-
graphic functions, protocols, policy models, specifi-
cations, and the use of formal methods for verification
and covert channel analysis. The means for analysis
is based on discrete math, information theory, and
December 1998 27
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mathematical logic such as standard predicate calcu-
lus, modal logic, and specialized belief logics.
The educational outcomes achieved through a study
of reasoning tools and theoretical results include a clear
understanding of the mathematical, logical, and phys-
ical concepts that form the analytical basis and princi-
ples of construction. They also include the ability to
apply analytical concepts and principles of construc-
tion to the analysis and construction of real systems.
Identifying assumptions
Security is never the princi-
pal objective of a system.
Systems are designed to
provide services. In this
sense, security engineering
must always take place
within the context of the
overall system objectives.
Each engineering discipline
makes assumptions regard-
ing the various objectives of
the components, services, and properties available at
each level of design. In fact, design levels and levels of
abstraction are defined by these assumptions as well
as by the particular rules of composition used for cre-
ating structures of components.
For example, designers of authentication protocols
assume the presence of encryption functions of suit-
able strength. Designers of software assume the cor-
rectness of the hardware platform supporting the
instruction-set architecture. Secure system designers
may assume that the system security administrator is
trustworthy and that the compiler—placed under con-
figuration management—does not contain artifices to
create trapdoors.
It is essential that the consistency between the
assumptions of security engineers and other engi-
neering concerns be checked. Mismatches in design
levels, frames of reference, or applications cause incon-
sistent assumptions. By learning to compare differing
assumption sets, students can increase their ability to
state, justify, and check the consistency of their design
assumptions.
Identifying implications and consequences
In all engineering pro-
cesses, the implications of
design decisions and sys-
tem behaviors affect risk
analysis, cost, ease of man-
ufacture, ease of mainte-
nance, reliability, and
ethics. Determining impli-
cations and consequences
means relying on all the
previous elements of ABET’s Criterion 3. Correctly
balancing consequences is sometimes called business
sense, which successful system architects and design-
ers find to be based on experience, empirical reason-
ing, and conceptual reasoning coupled with a deep
understanding of intended purposes or goals.
Determining the ethical consequences of computer
use is complex but may be based on the following
three ABET Engineering 2000 Criteria:
• an understanding of professional and ethical
responsibility;
• the broad education necessary to understand the
impact of engineering solutions in a global and
societal context; and
• a knowledge of contemporary issues.
By cultivating an understanding of consequences and
implications, students can anticipate and articulate
positive and negative consequences, and can more eas-
ily judge their likelihood.
Drawing inferences
The ability to draw infer-
ences from a great amount
of information is a skill
that must be refined
through years of practice.
While at school, students
should be encouraged to
attempt inferences. And in
terms of learning about
security, students should be
introduced to inference
techniques by being asked
to draw conclusions about systems security.
For example, security engineers make inferences in
the areas of fail-secure and secure-system recovery;
systematic penetration testing; and detection of evi-
dence proving abusive behavior based on profiling and
audit data. These concerns are common to both secu-
rity and engineering.
By focusing on inference techniques, students can
cultivate an ability to draw correct inferences based
on principles, observations, concepts, and data; to jus-
tify conclusions; and to draw conclusions that are rel-
evant and consistent.
INTEGRATING SECURITY INTO THE CURRICULUM
Security insights must be integrated within the exist-
ing information systems programs, rather than be
treated separately. The technical aspects of security
are closely related to computer science and engineer-
ing. And many of the goals, concepts, and reasoning
techniques are similar too. Thus, two approaches are
possible:
.
• Computer security could be the focus of the cur-
riculum, which would investigate the foundations
and technical approaches to security in consid-
erable depth.
• A computer science or computer engineering cur-
riculum could choose to use computer security as
an important property to be addressed in all
coursework.
Greg White and Greg Nordstrom5 have already
demonstrated the feasibility of successfully integrat-
ing security concerns into traditional courses. This
approach has the advantage of viewing security as an
integral part of computer engineering and science.
Topics appropriate to a security-oriented curricu-
lum include security policy models; formal methods
applied to system specification, development, and
analysis; hardware and software protection mecha-
nisms; secure system design, implementation, and test-
ing; database security; modern cryptography;
cryptographic protocols; key management and key
distribution; auditing; identification and authentica-
tion; and coherent network security architectures.6,7
Ideally, computer science and computer engineer-
ing texts, course materials, and laboratory exercises
would have computer security completely integrated
into appropriate topics. Unfortunately, such materi-
als do not yet exist. In the interim, however, security-
related supplements can be used.
AN EXAMPLE OF INTEGRATION
In a curriculum that places considerable emphasis
on visual simulation, for example, the possibility of
including security topics may seem rather far-fetched.
Even so, security requirements rest at the heart of
every system, and visual simulation systems are no
exception. They will depend upon the security of OSs,
databases, and networks to operate properly. Core
requirements in the visual simulation curriculum
might include stochastic modeling, system simulation,
physically based modeling, and image synthesis.
Students could be required to take courses in other
basic topics, such as networking, OSs, programming
languages, and software engineering. More advanced
topics might include the use of networking for virtual
environments and systems for creating virtual worlds.
Examples, exercises, and special topics could be
used to add security concepts to both introductory
and advanced courses. For instance, in beginning pro-
gramming courses, students might be given an exercise
to enter information into certificates or to check pass-
words. As part of a course in discrete mathematics,
students could discuss the use of Boolean arithmetic in
cryptography. A presentation on lattices could be
enlivened by showing how they can be used for for-
mally expressing mandatory security policies. Soft-
ware engineering students could take advantage
of existing cryptographic libraries while build-
ing a larger system.
While learning the basics of computer archi-
tecture, students could hone their assembly lan-
guage skills by experimenting with the
privileged instructions essential to building pro-
tection mechanisms. In networking, they could
examine not only traditional communications
protocols but also algorithms and protocols for
secure communications. Through experiments
in system configuration and management, stu-
dents could learn the value of well-defined procedures
to maintain the security of systems once they are oper-
ational. The notion of certified code for upgrades and
patches could illustrate concepts in authentication and
distribution of software for critical systems. 
More advanced courses could ask students to con-
sider security when designing software and networks
to support distributed simulations. Here, systems
issues relating to the protection of databases and algo-
rithms essential to creating a secure network could be
addressed. Students could be asked questions such as,
“Where are the cryptographic keys stored and why
do you believe they are protected?” and “How will
company-proprietary information be separated from
public information and how will it be protected?” By
asking tough questions such as these, students will
appreciate the fact that security must be an integral
part of system design.
WILL GRADUATES BE QUALIFIED?
How adequate is our plan? To answer this ques-
tion, we compare our educational objectives with
remarks made by employers in the computer security
field at the 1996 IEEE CS Symposium on Security and
Privacy,8 the 1997 ACM Workshop on Education in
Computer Security (WECS 97),9 and the 1997
National Colloquium for Information Systems
Security Education.10
All who made remarks specified that security is not
an isolated discipline but rather is part of the larger
context of engineering and computer science. Some
indicated that ethics should be part of security edu-
cation. The study of ethics is already part of an engi-
neering education and falls into the major objective
of implications and consequences. WECS 97 atten-
dees concluded that information responsibility should
be taught well before students enter institutions of
higher education.
Several of the participants suggested that opera-
tional expertise be applicable to industry—an idea that
is covered by several elements of our approach. Many
expressed specific concerns over linking security to
several engineering activities spanning requirements,
specification, design, implementation, testing, and val-
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idation. And there were requests that theory inform
practice and practice inform theory.
How well does the proposed framework meet the
accreditation requirements for engineering? The
accreditation criteria for electrical and computer engi-
neering programs proposed by the IEEE refer to
ABET’s Criterion 3 listed before. Programs must
demonstrate that graduates can
• achieve the outcomes listed in Criterion 3 in three
or more areas of electrical and/or computer engi-
neering;
• have the ability to apply the math and science nec-
essary to analyze and design complex devices and
systems containing hardware and software; and
• have knowledge of discrete mathematics.
There are broad similarities between the educational
outcomes we expect to emerge from our approach and
ABET’s Criterion 3. Thus, including computer and
network security topics within a computer science or
engineering curriculum will provide two benefits. First,
the topics will contribute to the educational outcomes
required for ABET accreditation. Second, integrating
the topics into a computer science or engineering cur-
riculum will add a highly relevant dimension to the
program—a feature prized by prospective employers.
The increasing use, reliance upon, and vulnera-bility of current large-scale information sys-tems demands that more resilient, reliable, and
secure systems be built and deployed. But too few
computer science and engineering programs today
pay adequate attention to security, even though secu-
rity concepts are fundamental and apply to all levels
of system and application design.
It is reasonable to ask that technically meaningful
ways be sought to integrate security into the engi-
neering and computer science curricula charged with
the education of the majority of system designers and
implementers. An approach based on educational out-
comes illustrates that security topics can contribute to
an engineering program by fostering all skills required
to produce graduates capable of critical thinking. ❖
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